

CHATHAM HOUSE MEMORANDA

CHINA AND TIBET, 1708-1959

A Résumé of Facts

by

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FOREWORD

In this essay, I have tried to trace the history of the Chinese presence in Tibet, this presence being made evident by a Chinese Resident (or Residents) and a Chinese garrison in Lhasa. I have consequently ignored - except by way of introduction - the history of Sino-Tibetan contacts prior to the late 17th/early 18th centuries.

The essay is not addressed to the Sinologist or the Tibetologist. Rather it is meant for the person whose reading does not normally include Sino-Tibetan history, but whose interest in that subject has been roused by recent events in Tibet.


I have indicated the sources of my information in the footnotes and in the bibliographical note at the end of the essay.

Such views as I have expressed are entirely mine.

Zahiruddin Ahmad

167 Woodstock Road,
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24 July, 1959



CHINA AND TIBET, 1708-1959: A RÉSUMÉ OF FACTS

Towards the end of the fourteenth century, a great religious reformer called Tsong-ka'pa founded a new sect of Buddhism in Tibet, which came to be known as the Yellow-capped Sect, to distinguish it from the older Red-capped Sect. The new Sect, which enjoined celibacy and temperance on its priesthood, spread rapidly. In 1407 the lamasery of Gadan, and in 1418 that of Sera (both near Lhasa) were founded. In or shortly after the latter year Tsong-ka'pa died.

His successor, Gedundub, felt strong enough to go to Shigatse, the headquarters of the Red-capped lama, and to establish there the lamasery of Tashilhunpo. Later Gedundub, who died in 1474, was recognized as the first re-incarnation of the guardian spirit of Tibet: Chenresi or the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara.

During the reign of the third re-incarnation - by name Sonam Gyatso - Kung Daiji Kutuktai Setzen, the de facto Khan of the Ordos Mongols, and his grand-uncle, Altan Khan, Khan of the Tumed Mongols,¹ became converts to the Yellow Sect.

¹/ The Mongols of Mongolia (or the Eastern Mongols) were divided into two wings called Right Wing (Segon gar) and Left Wing (Baraghon gar) respectively. Each wing was composed of three Tumans, each Tuman consisting of 10,000 troops. Thus Khalka, Chakhar, and Uriang Khan were the Tumans of the Right Wing, and Ordos, Tumed, and Jungshiyabo (or Kharatshin) those of the Left Wing. In the seventeenth century the Chinese divided the Mongols into Banners (or Kochuns), each Banner consisting of a number of Companies (or Nurus). Ideally, a Company comprised 150 families.

H. H. Howorth, in his History of the Mongols (London, Longmans 1876), Vol. 1 (The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks), follows the Chinese divisions as follows:

- (1) 8 Banners of the Chakhar Tuman (pp. 384-8)
 - (2) The 49 Banners, grouped into 6 Brigades or Corps, consisting of
 - (a) The Khotshids or Khagotshids
The Sunids
The Wesumutshins
The Aokhans and
The Naimans
of the Chakhar Tuman
(pp. 390-5)
 - (b) The Dsarods or Dzaraguts
The Barins or Bagharins and
The Keshiktens
of the Uriang Khan Tuman
(pp. 396-9) and
 - (c) The Ordos
The Tumeds
The Jungshiyabo (or Kharatshin)
of the Baraghon gar (or Left
Wing) (pp. 399-433)
- over/

In 1576 Sonam Gyatso went to the Ordos country at the invitation of Altan Khan, and the latter conferred on him, in respect, the titles of Dalai Lama Vajradhara. By a happy accident, the spirit of the Bodhisattva Avalokita, after quitting the body of Sonam Gyatso in 1587, was found to have become incarnate in the great-grandson of Altan Khan, Yontan Gyatso (1588-1615). In 1600 Yontan left Mongolia for Tibet, to study under the famed head of Tashilhumpo lamasery, Ch'osgyi Gyaltsan, leaving a spiritual representative with the Mongols.

The connections thus established between Tibet and Mongolia were to bring Tibet into close touch with China, for the Mongols had a habit of harrying the northern provinces of the Chinese Empire and it seemed obvious to the Chinese that one way of calming the marauders was by using the good offices of the lama to whom they gave implicit obedience.

Lozang Gyatso, 1615-80

Yontan's successor was the son of a Tibetan official, who took the name of Lozang Gyatso. In his time Tibet was divided into three parts: Kham or Eastern Tibet, Wu or Central Tibet (capital Lhasa), and Tsang or Western Tibet (capital Shigatse). There were temporal rulers called Regents (Desi) in Western and Central Tibet, but the Regent - or, as he was called, the 'King' (Tsanpo) - of Central Tibet seems to have enjoyed precedence over the others. In 1630 the Regent of Tsang, who was an adherent of the Red-capped Sect, captured Lhasa, overthrew the Tsanpo, and assumed the kingship himself. After enduring his persecution for some years the fifth Dalai Lama summoned to his aid Gushi Khan, Khan of the Kalmuk (or Olot) Mongols of the Koko-Nor area, otherwise known as the Khoshotes. In about 1641 Gushi Khan and Batur Kung

(footnote continued from previous page)

- (3) 86 Banners of the Khalka Tuman, grouped into 4 Brigades, as follows:
- (a) The Waidarya Naghor Brigade (19 Banners of the Western Khalkas, subject to the Jassaktu Khans) (pp. 456-73)
 - (b) The Khan Aghola Brigade (20 Banners of the Northern Khalkas, subject to the Tushiyetu Khans) (pp. 474-82).
 - (c) The Tsetserlik Brigade (24 Banners of the Middle Khalkas, subject to the Sain Noyans) (pp. 483-4)
 - (d) The Kerulun Bars Brigade (23 Banners of the Eastern Khalkas, subject to the Setzen Khans) (pp. 485-7).

At the time that Kung Daiji Kutuktai Setzen was de facto Khan of the Ordos Tuman, the nominal Khan was Bushuktu (1574-1624), who was also Viceroy (or Jinong) of the Left Wing, under the Great Khan (Khakan) of the Mongols. For the respective positions of the tribes and Tumans see Map 1.

Daiji, Khan of the Dzungarian Kalmuks (or Olots) of the Ili valley,^{1/} invaded Tibet and overthrew the Desi of Tsang. Gushi Khan then assumed, and subsequently transferred to the Dalai Lama, the temporal rule of Tibet, retaining for himself merely the command of the Mongol troops. These praetorian guards - as the Mongols in effect became - were to play a very important part in subsequent history.

Two other events of Lozang Gyatso's reign are memorable. Firstly, he recognized his (and his predecessor's) teacher, Ch'osgyi Gyaltsan, as the first Panchen Lama, and declared him to be an incarnation of the Buddha Amitabha, whose spiritual son, the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, was incarnate in the Dalai Lama himself. Secondly, he visited Peking in 1652-3. All evidence seems to point to the conclusion that he was treated as a fully independent sovereign.

Regency of Sanggye Gyatso, 1680-1705

But, almost inevitably, Tibet felt the impress of the rising power of the Manchus in China. Shortly after the return of Lozang Gyatso to Lhasa, the Regent of Tibet, Sanggye Gyatso - whom many believed to be the illegitimate son of the Dalai Lama - possibly fearing that the Manchus might use him (the Dalai Lama) to increase their influence in Tibet, appears to have intrigued with the enemies of the Chinese Empire. Thus when Wu San-kwei, Prince of Yunnan, rebelled in 1674, and the Emperor Kang Hsi (1661-1722) ordered the Koko-Nor Mongols to march against him, the Regent sent him a letter requesting him to pardon Wu.^{2/} In 1680 the Imperial Army intercepted a letter from Wu Shi-pan (Wu San-kwei's son) to Lhasa, offering to cede to the Tibetans the districts of Chung-tien and Wei-hsi if they would aid him in his flight to Koko-Nor.

At about this time, too, Galdan Daiji, a successor to the Batur Kung Daiji who had gone to Lhasa with Gushi Khan in 1641, incurred the hostility of the

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- ^{1/} The Western Mongols (of Sinkiang, Koko-Nor, Ninghsia, and Kansu) are known as Kalmuks to Russian and Western European writers, as O-lu-te or Olot to the Chinese. The dominant tribe of the Kalmuks were the Khoshotes of the Koko-Nor area. To this tribe belonged Gushi Khan and his great-grandson, Latsang Khan. The other notable Kalmuk tribe were the Dzungars, of whom Batur Kung Daiji and Galdan Daiji were Khans. (Howorth, pp. 457 ff.)
- ^{2/} For Wu San-kwei's rebellion see E. Haenisch, 'Bruchstücke aus der Geschichte Chinas unter der Mandschu dynastie, II: Der Aufstand des Wu San-kwei aus dem Sheng Wu Chi übersetzt', Toung Pao, March 1913; Sheng Wu Chi, ed., Annals of the Wars of the Manchu dynasty, 1603-1841, by Wei Yuan (d. 1856).

Chinese Emperor in a manner which can be briefly recounted here.

In 1661 Lozang Daiji Altan Khan, Khan of a branch of the Western Khalkas of the Jassaktu Khans, attacked his suzerain, Wangshuk the Jassaktu Khan, and slew him. Some of the Jassaktu clans refused to obey the usurper and migrated to the territory of Tsagun Dorje, the Tushiyetu Khan, Khan of the Northern Khalkas. With their help, the Tushiyetu Khan attacked and defeated the Altan Khan. Tsenggen, the brother of Wangshuk, was chosen as the new Jassaktu Khan, and the choice was confirmed by the Dalai Lama (1669).

Tsenggen now requested the Tushiyetu Khan to restore to him the Jassaktu clans which had fled eastwards in 1661. This the Tushiyetu Khan, who was much under the influence of his brother, the Hutukhtu (re-incarnate Bodhisattva) Chepsuntanpa or Jabzun, refused to do. The Jassaktu Khan then applied to the Dalai Lama, requesting him to persuade the Tushiyetu Khan to return the clans. But the Dalai Lama's envoy was won over by the Tushiyetu Khan. Tsenggen then approached the Emperor Kang Hsi, who urged the Dalai Lama to send another envoy to the Tushiyetu Khan.

In the meantime, however, the fifth Dalai Lama had died (1680), but the Regent of Tibet and the second Panchen Lama (Lozang Yeshe,) not wishing to disrupt the great influence which his name had had with the Mongols and others, announced that he had merely 'gone into seclusion', and continued to act in his name as if he were alive. In 1684, consequently, in compliance with the Emperor's request, a second envoy was sent 'from the Dalai Lama' to Mongolia, but he, unfortunately, died on the way. In that same year (1684) Tsenggen died, and a new Jassaktu Khan - Shara, son of Tsenggen - was installed as a protégé of Galdan Daiji, Khan of the Dzungarian Kalmuks. In 1686 a third envoy from Lhasa - a Hutukhtu - managed to hold a general assembly of the Khalkas in the territory of the Tushiyetu Khan. Galdan's representatives were present at this assembly.

The Kutuchta [Hutukhtu] from Thibet was a person of great consequence, and as the envoy of the Dalai Lama would naturally have presided, but the Kutuchta, brother of Tushiyetu Khan, insisted upon being treated with equal distinction, upon which the envoys of Galdan protested against the pretensions of the latter as an outrage upon their common high priest. The matter was at length settled by the two Kutuchtas being assigned seats opposite to one another. A solemn treaty was then entered into which the Tushiyetu Khan and his brother undertook to observe. News of the peace was sent to the Manchu court, and was much welcomed there.

Meanwhile the Tushiyetu Khan was by no means prompt in fulfilling the conditions of the peace, and Galdan ... sent an envoy to complain of this, and also to urge the carrying out of the treaty. The complaints of the envoy moved the Khalka Kutuchta to fury, and he sent him back to his master in chains, and with a rude letter. He followed

this up by attacking and defeating the Jassaktu Khan, and then by making a raid upon the territory of Galdan, seizing his brother, executing him, and parading his head about on a spear. With this provocation we are not surprised to find the Kalmuk chief marching against the Khalkas. He accordingly in the latter part of 1687 set out at the head of 30,000 men, and was joined by some of the chiefs of the Western Khalkas. ... On the river Timur he severely defeated Kaltan, the son of the Tushiyetu Khan. ... The Tushiyetu Khan and his brother the Kutuchta fled to the south of the Karong or limits, and encamped on the Chinese frontier, and Galdan did not fail to complain to the Imperial court of its offering refuge to such evil doers. He threatened to follow them there. The Khalka chief was now in great straits, and in conjunction with his brother the Kutuchta he wrote to the Emperor, offering to acknowledge themselves subjects of the Empire. [This offer was accepted.] A long correspondence was initiated between Galdan and the Emperor. The latter admitted that he [Galdan] had grievances, but said the Khalkas had been punished enough, while the former insisted that he should not be satisfied until the Tushiyetu Khan and his brother were surrendered to him.^{1/}

In 1689, while matters were in this highly inflammable state, a mission was sent from Lhasa to Peking requesting, 'in the name of the Dalai Lama', that the Tushiyetu Khan and the Hutukhtu of the Northern Khalkas should be surrendered to Galdan Daiji. This open request to further the schemes of Galdan roused the Emperor's suspicions. Wishing, however, to ascertain whether the request in fact proceeded from the Dalai Lama, he sent two missions to Lhasa, both of which were successfully thwarted by the Regent. In 1696 the Emperor went out in person to Mongolia and defeated Galdan at Teregi, south of Urga. From some of the prisoners he learnt that the Dalai Lama had been dead for sixteen years. The Emperor's doubts were now cleared: he fixed the entire blame for his troubles in the western regions on the Regent of Tibet, Sanggye Gyatso. On being confronted with these charges by the Emperor's emissaries, the Regent denied them, said that a search had been made for the new incarnation, that he had been found and was being taught. In 1696 this boy was installed as the sixth Dalai Lama, with the name of Tsanggyang Gyatso.

He turned out, however, to be an entirely dissolute and worldly-minded youth. In 1702, consequently, the Khan of the Dzungars, Tsewang Rabtan (a nephew, but no friend, of the late Galdan Daiji), and the Commander of the Mongol troops in Lhasa, Latsang Khan, informed him that he could not be

^{1/} Howorth, pp. 476-8. See also Maurice Courant, 'L'Asie centrale aux 17ième et 18ième siècles: Empire kalmouk ou Empire mantchu?' Annales de l'Université de Lyon, new ser., vol. 2, pt. 26, 1912, for a synchronized study of Kalmuk relations with Russia and China.

acknowledged as a true reincarnation. The Dalai Lama gracefully surrendered his spiritual headship, but the action brought the wrath of the Regent on the head of Latsang Khan. In 1705 Latsang attacked and slew Sanggye Gyatso. The Emperor of China was greatly pleased at the removal of the man whom he held responsible for disturbing the peace in the West, and conferred on Latsang the title of 'Religious, Helping, Submissive Khan' (I fa Kung Shun Han).

Latsang Khan, 1705-17

Sanggye Gyatso's removal necessitated that of his protégé. In 1706 Tsanggyang Gyatso was consequently killed, and a Lama from Chakpori (a lamasery in Lhasa) was installed as the true successor of Lozang Gyatso, and took the name Yeshe Gyatso.

But this act of removing a Dalai Lama - even one from whom understanding (bodhi) had departed - and installing another in his place, gave deep offence to the princes of the Koko-Nor. Acting on their complaints, the Emperor Kang Hsi sent a Commission of Inquiry to Lhasa, composed of Grand Secretary, La Tu-hun, and representatives of the Koko-Nor princes. They reported that the Chakpori Lama was the true Dalai Lama, but 'in view of the fact that the princes of the Koko-Nor are dissatisfied with Latsang Khan, and his management of affairs in Tibet, the latter should not be left to manage them alone, and an official should be sent to Lhasa to assist him'. In 1708, accordingly, Ho Shou, a Vice-President (Chinese shih-lang = Manchu ashan-i amban)^{1/} of a Board, was sent to Tibet. He was the first Chinese Resident (Amban) in Lhasa, though the post was not officially established till after 1727-8. Ho Shou's specific orders were to support Latsang Khan against the disaffected, and to finish putting order among the partisans of the late Regent (Sanggye Gyatso). He was given the title of 'Administrator of Tibetan Affairs' (Kuan-li hsi-tsang shih-Wu), but not having any troops at his command he was more of a diplomatic envoy, functioning only with the goodwill of Latsang Khan.

The Tibetans, however, had yet to be convinced that the Chakpori lama was the true Dalai Lama. That title, it was claimed, belonged rightfully to a child who had been born in 1708, in Litang, in the Kham province. With Latsang in power, this little rival of his nominee was, obviously, in danger. His parents fled with him to Koko-Nor, but the family was arrested by order of the Chinese Emperor, and imprisoned at Kumbum monastery, near Koko-Nor (1715).

This increase of Chinese influence in Tibet could not but cause alarm to Tsewang Rabtán, the Khan of the Dzungarians. He first lulled Latsang into a

^{1/} The higher officials of the Manchu Empire were usually Manchu by race, and used Manchu titles.

false sense of security by giving his daughter in marriage to Latsang's son. Next he entered into a compact with the lamas of Sera, Drepung and Tashilhunpo to rid them of Latsang and his Dalai Lama. Then he attacked.

Unfortunately, Tsewang Rabtan's own force was routed by the Chinese on its way to the south. But Tsering Dondrub, a former lama of Tashilhunpo, managed to advance to Lhasa from the West and captured it on 30 November 1717. Latsang Khan died fighting. Yeshe Gyatso was deposed and lived thenceforth as an ordinary lama, first at Chakpori and then (1720-5) at Peking.

Chinese Invasion, 1720

The news of the fall of the pro-Chinese ruler of Tibet was obviously disquieting to the Emperor of China. With a remarkable volte face, Kang Hsi now put himself forward as the champion of legitimacy, and proclaimed that he would bring back to Tibet the real Dalai Lama, the child whom he had himself imprisoned at Kumbum. He appealed to all Tibetans to aid him in his noble enterprise. In 1720 Tsewang and Tsering Dondrub were both defeated by the Imperial Army, and the Chinese entered Lhasa. Father Ippolito Desideri, of the Society of Jesus, was an eye-witness to these events, and in his narrative he says that the Chinese behaved 'with great moderation'^{1/} - though, of course, the more prominent pro-Dzungarian Tibetans were put to death. After three years of pillage and persecution at the hands of the Dzungars, the Tibetans were inclined to welcome the Chinese as the restorers of peace and order. Kalzang Gyatso, as the new Dalai Lama was called, was installed as spiritual head; and temporal power was conferred on him by order of the Emperor.

Having made this concession to Tibetan feeling, the Chinese proceeded to strengthen their influence in Tibet. In the first place, south-eastern Tibet, consisting of the regions of Batang, Litang, and Tachienlu, was detached from Tibet and placed under the rule of the Governor of Szechwan. Secondly, a Council (Kashag) of Ministers (Kalons) was set up, consisting of:

(a) two senior ministers:

- (1) Sonam Gyalpo of Kang-chen, 'Prime Minister' and Governor of Central Tibet, and
- (2) Na-pod-pa Dorje Gyalpo, Governor of Kong-po (the country immediately east of Lhasa), and

1/ Il Tibet secondo la relazione del viaggio del P. Ippolito Desideri (1715-21), Rome, La Società geografica Italiana, 1904, p. 358.

(b) two junior ministers:

(3) Lum-pa-nas Tashi Gyalpo, Governor of the Lohit valley, and

(4) a representative of the Yellow Sect.

Closely associated with the Council were two persons who, though not official members, gradually established themselves as extraordinary or additional members. One was the father of the Dalai Lama (Sonam Dargyal), and the other Sonam Stobgyal of Po-lha, Governor of western Tibet. Sonam Gyalpo of Kang-chen and Sonam Stobgyal of Po-lha were both prominent Latsangites, that is, pro-Chinese. Lum-pa-nas had also held an official appointment in Latsang's time.

Thirdly, a garrison, consisting at first of 3,000 men, was permanently stationed by the Chinese at Lhasa. Its commander supervised the working of the Council of Ministers and had a right to intervene when Chinese interests were involved.

In 1721 the bulk of the Chinese army marched back to China, leaving detachments along the road at Lhoron Dzong, Khamdo, Batang, Litang, and Tachienlu. Next year a special emissary sent from Peking to the garrison at Lhasa reported that 1,600 of the 3,500 troops could safely be withdrawn. But in 1723 the Emperor Yung Cheng (1722-35), as part of his general policy of retrenchment, ordered the withdrawal of the entire garrison from Lhasa, leaving only 1,000 men at Khamdo.

Chinese Invasion, 1728

The principle enshrined in the arrangement of 1720, of combining provincial governorships with membership of the Council of Ministers, did not work well. Sonam Gyalpo of Kang-chen, for instance, was far more interested in his native Na-ris (the Manas Sarovar area) than in the central government in Lhasa. In 1725 the Emperor ordered him to divide his time between Na-ris and Lhasa, and decreed that while he was in his province, his functions at Lhasa should be exercised by Na-pod-pa. Later in the same year the titles of 'Prime Minister' (Tsung-li) and 'Deputy Prime Minister' (Hsieh-li) were formally conferred on Sonam Gyalpo and Na-pod-pa respectively.

If this measure had been designed to make the Council into a workable body, the Imperial order requiring the members to persecute the Red-capped sect certainly split it into two hostile factions. Religious persecution was entirely alien to Tibetan feeling, and the order was bitterly opposed by the Dalai Lama himself, his father, Na-pod-pa, and Lum-pa-nas. Even Sonam Stobgyal, otherwise staunchly pro-Chinese, advised caution. But Sonam Gyalpo insisted on enforcing the order. On 6 August 1727 he was assassinated while sitting in council. A short civil war ensued, ending on 3 July 1728, when Sonam Stobgyal

captured Lhasa. Two months later, on 4 September 1728, the Chinese forces (15,000 Chinese and 400 Manchus) re-entered Lhasa. Na-pod-pa and Lum-pa-nas were killed by the 'slicing process' (ling-chih), the others were either strangled or decapitated. The Dalai Lama was removed to Kata for six years, and in order to counter his political influence in Tibet the Panchen Lama was granted the temporal sovereignty of the western part of Tsang province.

Sonam Stobgyal of Po-lha was then confirmed as temporal ruler of Tsang, and two of his nominees were appointed Ministers at Lhasa, in charge of central Tibet. Two Chinese Ambans were posted at Lhasa, one to supervise western Tibet, the other central Tibet. With them there was a garrison of 2,000 troops; a further 1,000 troops were posted at Khamdo. Five years later (1733) the garrisons were reduced to 500 each.

For nineteen years (1728-47) Sonam Stobgyal was the virtual ruler of Tibet. In recognition of this fact, the Emperor Chien Lung (1735-96) conferred on him, in 1740, the title of Chun-Wang or Prince of the Second Class, commonly referred to as 'King' by the European missionaries.

Gyurmed's Conspiracy, 1750

Sonam Stobgyal died in 1747. His son, Gyurmed Namgyal, who succeeded him, was, unlike his father, no lover of the Chinese. Dissimulating at first, he persuaded them to withdraw 400 troops from Lhasa, leaving only 100. Next he sought permission from the Chinese Emperor to send monks of the Yellow Sect to preach in those parts of Tibet which had been annexed to China in 1720. Wiser after the events of 1728, the Emperor saw in this request an attempt to regain political influence in Kham. He therefore 'reserved his reply, pending an investigation into the matter' - that is, refused permission, - ordered the Ambans at Lhasa to get into touch with the Governor of Szechwan and the military Commander of western Szechwan.

Gyurmed went ahead with his plans. Now he accused his elder brother, the Governor of Na-ris, of oppressing the monasteries and plundering the trade-routes of western Tibet. On the pretext of protecting these monks and traders, Gyurmed began to collect troops. The real aim was, undoubtedly, to consolidate his authority in Tibet. On 25 January 1750 the elder brother 'died' under mysterious circumstances. Shortly thereafter Gyurmed occupied his province.

His next move was to seek an alliance with Wang Shu-ko, a powerful chieftain of Koko-Nor, by marrying his daughter. Just before that marriage could take place the Chinese Ambans at Lhasa struck - and struck devastatingly. On 11 November 1750 they invited Gyurmed to their office for a conference. Once the doors had closed upon him, one of the Ambans seized him by the arm, while the other ran a sword through his body. Gyurmed was little loved in Tibet, and the matter might have ended there. But a minor official - one Lozang Tashi

managed to raise an anti-Chinese riot, in the course of which the Chinese Residency was burnt and the two Ambans killed, together with some 50 soldiers and 80 civilians.

Luciano Petech is inclined to decry this as a mere 'outbreak of town violence and rowdiness', a 'purely local outburst',^{1/} but the fact that such an uprising did take place and that it was directed against the Chinese shows, perhaps, that anti-Chinese feeling was seething under the surface, and needed only to be brought above it.

The Dalai Lama took the situation immediately in hand. He appointed Pandita, a nephew of Sonam Gyalpo of Kang-chen, as his Prime Minister. He gave refuge in the Potala to such Chinese as had escaped the mob. And he forbade all Tibetans to aid Lozang Tashi.

In January 1751 the Chinese Resident in Koko-Nor arrived at Lhasa and put to death the rebel leaders by the usual Chinese methods of slicing, strangling, and beheading. A little later the Governor of Szechwan came with a small force and reorganized the administration as follows. The office of Chun-wang was abolished. A new Council was set up, two of whose members were to be nominated by the Dalai Lama and two by the Chinese. The Chinese nominees were no other than the two Ministers at Lhasa appointed by Sonam Stobgyal of Po-lha. The responsibility for defence and the maintenance of law and order was placed on four generals (da-pons) - two in central Tibet and two in western Tibet - who were nominated by the Council but held their Commissions from the Emperor. To the two Ambans were reserved the right of drafting and forwarding all official correspondence to Peking, the management of supplies for the Chinese garrison at Lhasa, and the control of the postal service to China. A garrison of 1,500 was permanently posted at Lhasa.

In all these proceedings [writes Luciano Petech] the sovereignty of the Dalai Lama is always understood, but nowhere expressly affirmed in the Chinese documents ... The reason is that the Chinese believed that they were merely restoring the regime which had existed in the time of the fifth Dalai Lama ... No formal appointment was therefore made, and indeed, the official proclamation of the new regime merely stated that 'the Dalai Lama is the ruler of Tibet' and the bKa'-blon (= Kalons) must obey him,^{2/} as it had been the rule since the time of the fifth Dalai Lama.

1/ Luciano Petech: China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century (Leiden, Toung Pao, 1950), pp. 215-16.

2/ China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century, p. 213.

1793

The fourth strengthening of Chinese influence in Tibet came after the Gurkha invasion of 1791-2. In order to prevent future incursions the Chinese decided to increase their authority in Tibet. They did so in the following manner:

1. The two Residents, stationed respectively at Lhasa and Shigatse, were empowered to confer with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama,^{1/} on all matters concerning Tibet, 'on a perfect footing of equality'. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were deprived of their right to memorialize the Emperor directly. Henceforth they were only to report to the Residents and ask for orders.

2. Foreign Affairs

All communications with foreign states was to be sent through the Residents. Correspondence addressed to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, or to the Kalons, by foreign states, had to be made known to the Residents and were in fact replied to by the Residents.

3. Defence

The defence of the frontiers was made the responsibility of the Residents. For this purpose 1,000 Mongolian and 1,000 Chinese troops were permanently stationed in Tibet. In addition, the Residents were empowered to raise and maintain a regularly paid native Tibetan army.

4. Internal Administration

The Kalons were to be formally appointed by the Emperor, on the recommendation of the Residents. All officials (excluding those of minor rank) were to be selected by the Dalai and the Panchen Lama, with the advice and consent of the Residents. The number, pay, and duties of the officials, both lay and ecclesiastical, were regularised.

5. Finance and Currency

The Residents were given the power to examine the revenue and expenditure of the Potala and Tashilhunpo, subject to the limitation that they could not interfere with the personal funds of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. A new currency, bearing the title of the Emperor, was issued as the only legal tender, and a Chinese mint was established in Lhasa.

1/ The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama resided normally at the Potala in Lhasa, and the Tashilhunpo monastery, near Shigatse, respectively.

6. Foreign Trade


The periods of the year during which, and the routes along which, trade with foreign states could be carried on, as well as the number of merchants who could engage in such trade, were specified. Passports were issued to both traders and pilgrims, import duties were regularized, and attempts to evade paying them were met with punishment. Foreigners wishing to enter Tibet had to obtain a permit and submit to a check at the frontier.

7. Lastly, the Emperor, as 'Protector of the Yellow Sect', issued a decree regulating the procedure by which higher appointments were to be made in that Sect. Too often had reincarnations been found in politically powerful families whose adherence to the rulers of Tibet would be advantageous. Now the names of probable reincarnations were to be written on slips of paper, which were to be sealed and placed inside a golden urn. Amidst prayers, in the presence of Tibetan notables and the Chinese Residents, the Dalai Lama - or the Panchen Lama, if the selection was that of the Dalai Lama - was to pick out a slip at random, and the person whose name appeared on the slip was to be appointed, subject to the Emperor granting him a formal patent of investiture.

Decline of Chinese Influence

The above decrees indicate, no doubt, the high-water mark of Chinese influence in Tibet. How far they were obeyed is, of course, another question. We know that in 1808 the ninth Dalai Lama was chosen by the usual Tibetan methods. An envoy was, on that occasion, sent to Lhasa to point out that the choice was irregular, but that it would be acquiesced in provided that the edict of 1793 was conformed to in future. In 1818, when the Tibetan methods were sought to be applied again, a sharp rebuke was addressed to Lhasa and the petition to apply Tibetan methods of selection was rejected. In 1822 the tenth Dalai Lama was selected by the Chinese method.

Throughout the nineteenth century, as is well known, the authority of the Manchu dynasty was growing steadily weaker. In 1839 the first Anglo-Chinese War broke out and troops had to be sent to southern China. In Tibet, consequently, greater reliance was placed on the indigenous soldiers, who were now supplied with better weapons. In 1841 the Dogra invasion was repelled by Tibetan troops, and in 1864 the rebellion in Nyarong was likewise suppressed by the Tibetans, Nyarong being then annexed to Tibet. During the term of Chishan's Residency (1843-7) the supervision of the Tibetan treasury and of the Tibetan troops was given up. At about the same time the Tibetan administration became independent of Chinese control.



Enter the British^{1/}

In 1861 a treaty was signed between the British Government and the ruler of Sikkim by which the latter agreed to refer any disputes - largely concerning rights of trade and pasturage - between his people and those of neighbouring states to the arbitration of the former, and to abide by its decision. Sikkim also engaged not to lease any portion of its territory to any foreign power without the prior consent of the British Government. It has since been questioned whether the ruler of Sikkim, who was merely an official of the Lhasa Government, had the right to enter into such engagements.

Fifteen years later, by an additional article in the Chefoo Convention (1876) between China and Great Britain, the latter obtained a promise of Chinese protection for an exploratory mission to Tibet.^{2/} In 1885 Colman Macaulay, a Secretary to the Government of Bengal, was granted permission to conduct such a mission, but in the next year - in view of China's recognition of the British annexation of Burma - the mission was cancelled before it had ever set out. The Tibetans took the withdrawal of the mission as a sign of weakness. They crossed the Jelep-La and built a fortress at Lingtu in Sikkim.

In March 1888 the British attacked and drove the Tibetans out of Lingtu. Two years later, in 1890, an Anglo-Chinese Convention was signed at Calcutta, Britain being represented by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, China by the Chinese Resident at Lhasa. This Convention demarcated the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet (Art. I) and recognized Sikkim as a British Protectorate (Art. II), protection being defined as follows:

It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is admitted, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have any official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any country.^{3/}

1/ For Bogle's and Manning's visits to Tibet in 1774 and 1811 respectively see C.R. Markham, Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa (London, Trubner, 1876). For Turner's mission in 1783 see his own Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet (London, 1806). See also Francis Younghusband, India and Tibet (1910), chs. 1-3.

2/ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 71, pp. 753-9.

3/ ibid., vol. 82, pp. 9-11 (International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, p. 105)

By Regulations signed at Darjeeling in 1893 under the above Convention, it was agreed that a trade-mart should be opened at Yatung, on the Tibetan side of the frontier, on or before 1 May 1894. British and Tibetan representatives were to be posted there to supervise the trade.^{1/}

The Tibetans now blamed the Chinese for having ceded to Britain territory which, since 1794, had been Tibetan. They also complained of being subjected to hitherto unknown rules and regulations in the exercise of their customary rights of trade and pasture in what was now Sikkimese territory.

The situation which arose was, therefore, this: the Tibetans refused to abide by the Convention of 1890 because it had been entered into without prior consultation with them; and refused at the same time to have any direct dealings with the British, pointing out that Tibet's foreign relations were China's concern.^{2/} And the Chinese on their part were unable to enforce - and admitted to their inability to enforce - Tibetan compliance with the Convention.

Colonel Francis Younghusband, who led the British Expedition to Tibet in 1903-4, in building up the case for that expedition, points to four main causes:^{3/}

- (1) The Tibetan 'aggression' at Lingtu, in Sikkim, in 1885-6.
- (2) Tibetan refusal to implement the agreements of 1890-93:
 - (a) the trade mart at Yatung had not been opened by 1 May 1894;
 - (b) the Tibetans had built a wall across the Chumbi valley, on the further side of Yatung, thus preventing any intercourse between Yatung and the interior of Tibet;
 - (c) they had imposed an ad valorem duty of 10 per cent. at Phari Dzong;
 - (d) they had impeded the work of demarcating the Tibet-Sikkim frontier - until, in 1895, the British refused the Chinese request to postpone the demarcation and erected two boundary pillars. Both of these pillars were destroyed by the Tibetans.

1/ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 85, pp. 1235-7 (The Question of Tibet, p. 107)

2/ In 1899 the Dalai Lama in effect requested the British to take up the matter of direct British-Tibetan relations with the Chinese: in 1901 he returned unopened to the Viceroy the letter which again urged the establishment of direct relations (Cd. 1920, p. 154).

3/ See Younghusband, chs. 4-7.

- (3) Chinese ineffectiveness in enforcing the 1890 Convention and the 1893 Regulations, until, in 1903, Lord Curzon (the Viceroy and Governor-General of India) came to the conclusion that Chinese suzerainty in Tibet was 'a constitutional fiction - a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties'.^{1/}
- (4) Russian intrigues in Central Asia.

In 1900 the Tsar of Russia had received the Dalai Lama's tutor, the Buryat-Mongol Dorjjeff. It was pointed out by the Russian Foreign Office that Dorjjeff's visit was concerned with purely religious matters, touching the Tsar's Buddhist subjects, but, as Younghusband says,

Although it might be true that the Russians had no mind to have any dealings with the Tibetans, yet the Tibetans might still think that they could rely on the Russians to flout us ... We had still this erroneous impression to reckon with.^{2/}

On 22 July 1895 the Government of Bengal put forward to the Government of India the idea of a British military expedition to Tibet, 'to march in and hold the Chumbi valley', as security for the fulfilment of the engagements of 1890-3. On 26 January 1903 this proposal, now put forward as one for a commercial mission to Lhasa accompanied by an armed escort, was made by the Government of India to the Home Government. The Secretary of State for India, however, sanctioned, in the first instance, a commercial mission - accompanied by 500 armed men - to Khamba Dzong (July - October 1903). On the failure of negotiations at Khamba Dzong, a military mission through the Chumbi valley to Gyantse was approved (October 1903 - July 1904). But as even at Gyantse, the emissaries of the Dalai Lama 'showed no eagerness for a settlement' - according to Younghusband - and advance to Lhasa had to be undertaken (July - August 1904), and on 3 August 1904 the British reached Lhasa, after having disposed of some 1,700 Tibetans on the way from the frontier. The Dalai Lama fled to Urga, after appointing as Regent the Ti Rimpoche - the head of Gaden monastery - and empowering him to use his seal. On 7 September 1904, in the presence of the Chinese Amban, the Convention was signed in the Potala, between the United Kingdom and Tibet, the latter being represented by the Regent, representatives of

^{1/} Curzon to Hamilton (Secretary of State for India), 8 January 1903, (Cd. 1920, no. 66, p. 154.)

^{2/} Younghusband, p. 83. For recent work on the subject of Russian intrigues in Central Asia see P. L. Mehra, 'Tibet and Russian Intrigue', Journal of Rl. Central Asian Soc., January 1958, and Alastair Lamb, 'Some Notes on Russian Intrigues in Tibet', *ibid.* January 1959, and the references contained in these articles.

the monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Gaden, and representatives of 'the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly'.^{1/}

This Convention confirmed the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 (Art. I); opened two new trade-marts at Gyantse and Gartok (Art. II); bound the Tibetan Government to pay an indemnity of Rs. 75 lakhs, in 75 annual instalments (Art. VI); and permitted the British to occupy the Chumbi valley as security for the payment of the indemnity and for the effective opening of the trade-marts for three years continuously, whichever was later (Art. VII). 'As an act of grace', the indemnity was, shortly after the signing of the Convention, reduced to Rs. 25 lakhs and it was declared that the occupation of the Chumbi valley would end after the payment of three annual instalments.^{2/}

These arrangements were confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention signed at Peking on 27 April 1906.^{2/} The indemnity was paid by China, on behalf of Tibet, the last instalment being paid in January 1908. The Chumbi valley was evacuated in the February following.

To complete this story of international agreements affecting Tibet mention must be made of the Anglo-Russian Convention, 'containing arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet', signed at St Petersburg on 31 August 1907.^{4/} This Convention recognized the 'suzerain rights' of China in Tibet. Article II ran as follows: 'In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China in Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet, except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government'. This excluded existing commercial arrangements between Great Britain and Tibet, and the right of Buddhist subjects of Great Britain and Russia to approach the religious dignitaries of Tibet directly, on purely religious matters. Chinese 'suzerainty' in Tibet would, therefore, seem to have implied in 1907 no more than the exclusive right to handle Tibet's foreign relations. On 20 April 1908 Britain and China arrived at an agreement amending the Trade Regulations of 1893.^{5/} Article 3 of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904

1/ British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 98, pp. 148-51.

2/ Viceroy's Declaration, *ibid.*, p. 151.

3/ *ibid.*, vol. 99, pp. 171-2.

4/ *ibid.*, vol. 100, pp. 558-9 (cited in The Question of Tibet, pp. 116-17). For a recent study of the Anglo-Russian Convention see R.P. Churchill's The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Iowa, Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, 1939).

5/ *ibid.*, vol. 101, pp. 170-5.

having required a fully-authorized Tibetan delegate to be present at, and participate in, discussions concerned with such amendment, 'the High Authorities of Tibet' now named a delegate 'to act under the direction of' the Chinese plenipotentiary. And thus, for the first time, a tri-partite international document concerning Tibet was signed by a foreign power, Tibet's suzerain, and Tibet.

1904-11

Sir Charles Bell writes:

Whether the Expedition of 1904 was justifiable or not on moral grounds or on grounds of political expediency, it may be thought that, having gone to Lhasa the British Government ought to have stationed a permanent Agent there. By going in and then coming out again, we knocked the Tibetans down and left them for the first comers to kick. We created a political vacuum, which is always a danger. China came in and filled it, destroying Tibetan freedom, for she feared that if we came in again, we should keep the country.^{1/}

The Chinese process of reasoning which sought to prevent future invasions of Tibet by strengthening their own authority there had been manifested, as we have seen, after the Gurkha irruption of 1791-2. It was now made evident again, after the British incursion of 1904.

On 10 September 1904 the Chinese issued a proclamation which said that

Tibet being a feudatory of China, the Dalai Lama will be responsible for the Yellow-Cap faith and monks, and will only be concerned slightly in official matters, while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs with the Tibetan officials, and important matters will be referred to the Emperor.^{2/}

The Chinese did not, as Bell says,^{3/} depose the Dalai Lama. They merely deprived him of his temporal powers and reduced him to the position of a mere spiritual head. At the same time the Chinese Government instructed Feng-chien, who had been appointed Deputy Resident at Lhasa, to proceed to Tibet in order to assert more direct control there. He fixed his temporary headquarters at

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- ^{1/} C.R. Bell, Tibet, Past and Present (Oxford Univ. Press, 1924), p. 71. Bell was acting Political Officer in Sikkim and Administrator of the Chumbi valley during the Younghusband Expedition. In 1906-7 he again acted as P.O. in Sikkim, and from 1908 to 1918 he was permanently posted there as P.O.
- ^{2/} Further Papers relating to Tibet, Cd. 2370, part II, annexure to enclosure no. 362, pp. 274-5.
- ^{3/} Bell, Tibet, pp. 55 and 68.

Batang, but a rebellion broke out and he was killed. Consequently, in 1906, the Imperial Government sent a punitive expedition to Tibet, under the command of Chao Erh-feng. Chao captured Batang; and Lien-yu, the newly appointed Resident at Lhasa, was able to proceed to his post. As Frontier Commissioner, Chao introduced certain reforms in eastern Tibet depriving the monasteries of their temporal powers and appointing Chinese magistrates to take over the local chiefs' judicial authorities. In 1908 he was appointed co-Resident with Lien-yu. He devoted the years 1908-9 to capturing Derge, Khamdo, Draya, and Markham. Finally, on 12 February 1910, he reached Lhasa.

As we have seen, the Dalai Lama had fled to Urga in 1904. Four years later he visited Peking, was received by the Emperor and the Dowager Empress, and, in keeping with the new policy of subordinating Tibet to China, was given the titles of 'the Loyally Submissive Vice-regent, the Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven', in place of the usual 'Great, Good, Self-Existent Buddha of Heaven'. In December 1909 the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. He had difficulties with the Resident Lien-yu. He had misgivings, too, about Chao Erh-feng's reforms in eastern Tibet. On the same day as the latter reached Lhasa with his troops the Dalai Lama fled to India.

The Republic of China, 1911-49

On 10 October 1911 the rule of the Manchu dynasty came to an end and the Republic of China was proclaimed. As soon as the news of the revolution reached Lhasa, fighting broke out between the Tibetans and the Chinese, and the Chinese garrison was besieged.

In China, meanwhile, the Republicans allocated seats to Tibet in their National Assembly, and placed a black bar in their five-coloured national flag to indicate Tibet. On 12 April 1912 President Yuan Shih-kai announced that Tibet was to be regarded as an integral part of the Republic, on an equal footing with any other province. He appointed Yin Chang-hang, the Governor of Szechwan, Commander of an expeditionary force to re-establish Chinese authority in eastern Tibet and to relieve the garrison at Lhasa.

In June 1912 the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, and through his influence an armistice was arranged, by the terms of which sixty Chinese soldiers were to remain at Lhasa as the personal bodyguard of the Resident (Lien-yu), the remainder to leave Tibet immediately with their Manchu commander, the hated Chung-yin. Just at this time the Chinese Republicans committed another act of indiscretion by appointing Chung-yin Resident, in place of Lien-yu, who was recalled. As soon as the latter had left, the Tibetans attacked Chung-yin and after a two months' siege compelled him to leave Lhasa with his troops (6 January 1913). Henceforth, till 1950-1, Tibet was virtually an independent state.

Simla Conference, 1913-14

Meanwhile, Yuan Shih-kai's proclamation had given offence to the British as well. On 16 August 1912 Sir John Jordan, the British Minister at Peking, met the President, and protested to him orally against the proclamation and the subsequent Chinese military manoeuvres in Tibet. Yuan replied that there was no treaty provision which prohibited the sending of Chinese troops to Tibet, but he assured Jordan that no attempt would be made to convert Tibet into a province. The next day, however, the British Minister addressed an official memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Office in which the suzerainty of China over Tibet was recognized, but the right of China to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet expressly denied. A written agreement admitting Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy was demanded.

This led to the Simla Conference (October 1913 - July 1914). The Tibetan delegate asserted Tibet's right to manage her internal and external affairs; to have no Chinese Amban or troops in Tibet; and to include all territory up to Tachienlu within the borders of Tibet.^{1/}

The Chinese replied^{2/} by demanding that Tibet should be regarded as an integral part of China, on the assurance that it would never be converted into a province; that Tibet's foreign and military affairs should be handled by China; that a Chinese Amban and 2,600 troops should be posted in Tibet; and that the eastern boundary of Tibet should be fixed at Gianda.^{3/}

To reconcile these two positions, the British proposed (17 February 1914) the division of Tibet into an outer (western) zone, and an inner (eastern) zone. The precedent for such divisions having been set by the Russo-Mongolian agreement of 1912 - whereby Mongolia had been divided into outer and inner zones, Outer Mongolia becoming, virtually, a Russian protectorate - and the Chinese having, by the Russo-Chinese agreement of 1913, accepted this division, they had now, perforce, to accept a similar division of Tibet. The difficulty arose over the boundaries between Outer and Inner Tibet.

The British proposed that the north-eastern boundary of Outer Tibet should be the Burkhan Buddha- Amne Machin Range, the eastern boundary at, roughly, the Yangtze River. This proved unacceptable to the Chinese. The farthest east

1/ Bell, Tibet, p. 152.

2/ Li Tieh-Tseng; The Historical Status of Tibet (New York, Columbia University, 1956), pp. 136 ff.

3/ See map.

they were prepared to withdraw was the Salween River, while conceding that the area between the Salween and the Yangtze was to constitute a 'special' area - though here, again, Batang, Litang, and Tachienlu were to be parts of China proper. On the north-east they refused to agree that the boundary of Outer Tibet should be farther north-east than the Dang-la Range.

In the final Draft Convention (27 March 1914),^{1/} prepared by the British, Chinese suzerainty was recognized over the whole of Tibet, Inner Tibet to be under Chinese administration, subject to the retention by Lhasa of existing rights in the matter of selecting and appointing heads of monasteries. Outer Tibet was to be autonomous. China was to refrain from interference in Outer Tibet's internal administration including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama, but was to have the right to post a Resident at Lhasa, with an escort of not more than 300 troops. In view of the differences regarding frontiers, the Chinese delegate refused to sign the Draft Convention. The British delegate pointed out that if China refused to sign, it would be signed by Britain and Tibet and would be enforced as between themselves. The Chinese delegate then initialled the Draft, but under instructions from his Government refused to sign the formal instrument. On 3 July 1914 the Convention was formally signed by Britain and Tibet.^{2/}

During the First World War the Tibetans gradually conquered the entire territory west of the Yangtze and, crossing that river, occupied Derge. By 1917 they were advancing towards Nyarong and Kanze. A truce was then arranged (1918) by which the eastern boundary of Tibet was fixed at the Yangtze River, with the exception of Derge (on the eastern side of the river) which was annexed to Tibet.

Nationalist Missions to Tibet

In 1930 the Chinese Nationalists, having finally established themselves as an effective Government in China, sent two missions to Tibet. The first was the semi-official mission of Miss Liu Man-ching, the second was official, and was headed by Kung-chueh-chung-ni. Kung put eight questions to the Dalai Lama, the first of which asked how relations between China and Tibet might be re-established. The Dalai Lama replied that

If the Central Government of China would treat the patronage relationship between China and Tibet with sincerity and good faith, as it previously did, Tibet on its part ... would, from now on, make

1/ The Question of Tibet, doc. 7, p. 124-7.

2/ Li Tieh-Tseng, Historical Status of Tibet, points out that this was contrary to Art. II of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. See above, for the text of the Simla Draft Convention.

an even greater effort to give full support to the Central Government.^{1/}

But, the Dalai Lama insisted, Tibet must enjoy autonomy, 'the area over which autonomy was to be exercised would be the same as before'. The Panchen Lama, who had fled to China in 1925, could return to Tibet, but merely as head of Tashilhunpo monastery.^{2/}

In that same year (1930) a minor incident in Pei-li village, in Kanze district, led to the recapture of Derge by the Chinese. The head lama of Ya-la-su monastery in that village wished to amalgamate it with a neighbouring monastery. The move was opposed by the local chieftain of Pei-li. The lama occupied the village. The Chinese garrison backed the chieftain, fighting ensued, the Tibetans were victorious, and went on to capture Kanze and Nyarong. In 1931 the Chinese counter-attacked and recaptured Kanze, Nyarong, Derge, and other places. Next year a truce was arranged, fixing the Yangtze as the boundary between China and Tibet.

On 17 December 1933 the thirteenth Dalai Lama died. To attend his obsequies (in 1934) the Nationalist Government sent General Huang Mu-sung, empowering him, at the same time, to propose that Tibet should be recognized as an integral part of China, on the assurance being given that it would enjoy its traditional autonomy. Defence, foreign affairs, communications, and the formal appointment of higher Tibetan officials - after selection by the Tibetan authorities - should be in Chinese hands, and China was to appoint a High Commissioner (instead of a Resident) at Lhasa. The Tibetans counter-proposed that Tibet should be an integral part of China in foreign relations only, but should never become a Chinese province. Tibetan authorities were to be subject to Chinese orders only if such orders were 'not harmful to Tibet'. The escort of the Chinese Resident or High Commissioner should never exceed twenty-five men. Derge and Nyarong should be returned to Tibet.

In view of the radically opposed points of view, it is not surprising that nothing much came out of these proposals and counter-proposals. However, Huang's proposal for the creation of a separate province in eastern Tibet was accepted by the Nationalists, and on 1 January 1939 the province of Sikang was formally instituted.

In 1940 a 'local office' of the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was set up in Lhasa in place of the High Commissioner. Next year, however, the pro-Chinese Regent - the Incarnate Buddha of Ra-dreng monastery - was

1/ Li, Historical Status of Tibet, p. 153.

2/ ibid., p. 154.

overthrown, and a Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs was set up by the Kashag.

In 1942-3 the status of Tibet came up again for discussion in international circles. The Burma Road having been closed, the Allies were interested in opening an alternative supply-route to China through Tibet. The Tibetans, however, feared that the proposed route would entail the reappearance of foreign, both British and Chinese, influence in their country. To remove these fears, the British suggested that China should declare her intention to respect the autonomy of Tibet. This the Chinese refused to do, asserting that Tibet was an integral part of China.

In 1949 the Chinese Nationalist officials were asked to leave Lhasa.

The People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949 the (Communist) People's Republic of China came into being. A year later, in October 1950, in order 'to free the three million Tibetans from imperialist oppression, and to consolidate the national defences of China's western corner', the People's Liberation Army invaded Tibet.^{1/}

On 26 October 1950 the Government of India sent a Note on Tibet to China, part of which reads:

In the present context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable ... The Government of India can only express its deep regret that ... the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problems of its relations with Tibet by force.

The Chinese reply, dated 30 October 1950, stated that

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory, and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet to liberate the Tibetan People and defend the frontiers of China.

^{1/} New China News Agency message from Peking (The Times, 25 October 1950). The Agency went on to quote a political mobilization directive, which said that the task of the Chinese forces would be to liberate the people of Tibet, to complete the unification of the whole of China, to prevent imperialism from invading an inch of the territory of the fatherland, and to safeguard and build up the frontier regions of the country. Trud, the organ of the Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions, accused 'American imperialists' of seeking to use Tibet as a 'backdoor for new aggression against China' (28 October 1950).

No foreign interference in what was China's domestic problem would be tolerated. As for the Indian Government's viewpoint that the invasion was 'deplorable', the Note ended by saying that this (viewpoint) was 'effected by foreign influence hostile to China'.

In their reply (31 October 1950) the Government of India repudiated the charge of foreign influence, and pointed to 'the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy, within the framework of Chinese suzerainty'.^{1/} The Chinese Government replied (17 November 1950) that the People's Liberation Army's entry into Tibet was intended to protect China's sovereign - note, sovereign not suzerain - rights there, and to preserve regional autonomy and freedom of worship. India was now accused of trying to influence and obstruct China's intentions.

Meanwhile, on 29 October 1950, the Government of India received an appeal from Tibet, requesting them to use their good offices with the Chinese Government to stop the fighting, and to help through diplomatic channels in preserving Tibetan autonomy. A similar appeal was received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 13 November 1950, from a Tibetan delegation in Kalimpong which wrote 'in the name of the Tibetan Cabinet and National Assembly and with the approval of the Dalai Lama,' and complained of an 'unwarranted act of aggression' on Tibet by China.^{2/}

A sponsor for Tibet's appeal to the United Nations was found in El Salvador. On 24 November 1950 the steering committee of the General Assembly considered El Salvador's request that the Tibetan appeal be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.^{3/} This was, however, prevented by a somewhat curious combination of powers. To the British delegate the legal position was not clear. The Soviet Union, predictably, took the line that Tibet was a part of China and that, therefore, the Tibetan question was China's domestic affair. The Nationalist Chinese delegate found himself, for once, in agreement with the Soviet representative in considering Tibet a part of China; but he was prepared to discuss the Tibetan appeal as part of the Chinese complaint of Soviet aggression in China. The final decision to exclude the Tibetan appeal was due in large measure to the Indian delegate's confident assertion that an honourable and peaceful solution could be reached on the spot. In this hope - that an on-the-spot solution was possible - the United States joined the other powers in voting for the exclusion of Tibet from the agenda of the General Assembly.

^{1/} For the Sino-Indian exchange of Notes see The Times, 3 November 1950. (The Question of Tibet, doc. 9, p. 132).

^{2/} U.N. General Assembly, A/1549, 24 November 1950.

^{3/} General Assembly Official Records, General Committee, 5th sess., 73rd meeting, 24 November 1950.

On 21 December 1950 the Dalai Lama left Lhasa for Yatung. In February 1951 the commander of the Chinese forces held a 'people's conference' at Khamdo, to which delegates from Lhasa were invited. It was announced at this conference that the Chinese would respect the political status of the Dalai Lama, ensure full freedom of religion, and protect the property of the monasteries.

Perhaps as a result of these assurances, the Dalai Lama decided to send delegates to China to arrive at a Sino-Tibetan agreement. The Kalon, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme (who had been captured by the Chinese at Khamdo in the autumn of 1950, and who became thenceforth a prominent pro-Chinese Tibetan), proceeded overland to Peking. Others, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army, Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, went to China via Delhi - where they met the Chinese Ambassador and Mr Nehru - Calcutta, and Hongkong. On 23 May 1951 the seventeen-point Sino-Tibetan agreement was signed.

Sino-Tibetan Agreement, 23 May 1951^{1/}

This agreement was signed between the Central People's Government (of the People's Republic of China) and 'The Local Government of Tibet'. The Tibetans were described as 'one of the nationalities within the boundaries of China'. The agreement was concluded in order to eliminate imperialist forces in Tibet; to accomplish the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China; to safeguard national defence; and to permit the Tibetans to free themselves and to return to the big family of the People's Republic of China, to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all the other nationalities in the country, and to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational work.

The Tibetan people, accordingly, returned to the big family of the Motherland (Art. 1), and the 'local government of Tibet' bound themselves to 'actively assist the [Chinese] People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet, and consolidate the national defence' (Art. 2). The right of the Tibetan people to 'national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government' was admitted (Art. 3). The Chinese agreed not to alter the existing political system in Tibet, principally meaning by this system, the status, powers, and functions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama (Arts. 4-6). Freedom of religious belief was accorded, the Chinese binding themselves furthermore to protect the lamaseries and not to effect any change in their incomes (Art. 7). The language and economy of Tibet were to be developed (Arts. 9-10), but 'in matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion

^{1/} For the text of the Agreement, see Shen Tsung-lien and Liu Shen-chi Tibet and the Tibetans (California, Stanford University Press, 1952), Appendix. (The Question of Tibet, doc. 10, p. 139).

on the part of the central authorities. The local government should carry out reforms of its own accord ...' (Art. 11).

Having made these concessions, the Chinese proceeded to entrench themselves in Tibet. Firstly, Tibet's external relations were to be handled by China (Art. 14). Secondly, the Tibetan army would be re-organized and absorbed into the People's Liberation Army (Art. 8). And thirdly, 'In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee, and a Military Area Headquarters in Tibet ...' (Art. 15).

One comment on the Agreement seems permissible here. On 20 June 1959 the Dalai Lama said at Mussoorie that the agreement was

thrust upon its people and government by the threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of their own free will, and the consent of the Government was secured under duress and at the point of the bayonet. My representatives were compelled to sign the agreement under threat of further military operations against Tibet by the invading armies of China leading to utter ravage and ruin of the country. Even the seal affixed to the agreement was not the seal of my representatives, but one copied and fabricated by the Chinese authorities in Peking and kept in their possession still.

While I and my Government did not voluntarily accept the agreement we were obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by its terms and conditions to save my people and country from the danger of total destruction. It was clear from the beginning that the Chinese had no intention of carrying out the agreement.^{1/}

In July 1951 Chang Ching-wu reached Lhasa, via India, to take up his duties as head of the Military and Administrative Committee and of the Military Area Headquarters. On 9 September 1951 units of the People's Liberation Army entered Lhasa, under Wang Ching-wei. A month later 20,000 more troops arrived under Chang Kuo-hua and Tan Kuan-san. In April 1952 the Panchen Lama appeared in Lhasa. In 1953, in accordance with Article 14 of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement, the Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs^{2/} was brought under Chinese control.

^{1/} The Question of Tibet, doc. 19, p. 196.

^{2/} See above, p. 22.

1954-59

On 29 April 1954, after four months of negotiations, a Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet was signed at Peking. The purpose of this agreement was to promote trade and cultural relations between 'the Tibet region of China' and India. By its terms India retained her outposts at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, but withdrew the military escorts of her agents at the first two places. She also sold to China her installations in Tibet, including twelve rest-houses. The Chinese established trade agencies at Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong.

What became the most famous part of the agreement, however, was the preamble, which enunciated five basic principles, the celebrated pancha śīla: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality of mutual benefit and (5) peaceful coexistence. These principles were reaffirmed in the joint Sino-Indian communiqué issued on the last day of Chou En-lai's first visit to India (25 - 28 June 1954).^{1/}

The next part of the story can be told in the Dalai Lama's own words:

They [the Chinese] compelled me ... to dismiss my Prime Ministers under threat of their execution without trial, because they had in all honesty and sincerity resisted the unjustified usurpation of power by the representatives of the Chinese Government ... Thus began a reign of terror which finds few parallels in the history of Tibet. Forced labour and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries, and the execution of certain leading men in Tibet - these are the glorious achievements of Chinese rule in Tibet.^{2/}

By the end of 1955 a struggle had started in the Kham province and this assumed serious proportions in 1956. In the consequential struggle, the Chinese armed forces destroyed a large number of monasteries. Many lamas were killed, and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China, and the interference in the exercise of religious freedom increased.^{3/}

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- 1/ India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Foreign Policy of India; Texts of Documents (New Delhi, October 1958), p. 87.
- 2/ Dalai Lama's statement at Mussoorie, 20 June 1959 (The Question of Tibet, doc. 19, p. 197).
- 3/ Dalai Lama's statement at Tezpur, 18 April 1959 (The Times, 20 April 1959; The Question of Tibet, doc. 17, p. 192). On 10 December 1956 in Calcutta Mr Chou En-lai, then on his second visit to India, denied that such a rebellion had taken place or was taking place. See in this context the report from Delhi by the Special Correspondent of The Times of an account by one Alo Chondze (a Tibetan exile) of conditions in Tibet under Chinese rule (The Times, 17 January 1957).

On 22 April 1956 a Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was set up, with the Dalai Lama as Chairman, the Panchen Lama as Vice-Chairman, and General Chang Kuo-hua as the representative of the Chinese Government. In practice, as the Dalai Lama said in his statement at Tezpur on 18 April 1959 (quoted above), even this body had little power and decisions on all important matters were taken by the Chinese authorities.

From 25 November 1956 to 22 January 1957 the Dalai Lama was in India to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's attainment of Enlightenment. The earlier part of the visit coincided with Chou En-lai's second visit to India (28 November - 10 December 1956). From his statement at Mussoorie on 20 June 1959, it seems that the Dalai Lama did not intend to return to Tibet, but did so only in deference to Mr Nehru's advice:

Before I visited India in 1956 it had become increasingly clear to me that my policy [of abiding by the 1951 agreement, of appeasing the people, and of persuading the Chinese to adopt a policy of conciliation and friendliness] had failed to create any impression on representatives of the Chinese in Tibet. I had practically made up my mind when I came to India not to return until there was a manifest change in the attitude of the Chinese authorities. I therefore sought the advice of the Prime Minister of India who has always shown me un-failing kindness and consideration.

After his talk with the Chinese Prime Minister and on the strength of assurances given by him on behalf of China, Mr Nehru advised me to change my decision. I followed his advice and returned to Tibet in the hope that conditions would change substantially for the better and I have no doubt that my hopes would have been realised if the Chinese authorities had on their part carried out the assurances which the Chinese Prime Minister had given to the Prime Minister of India. It was, however, painfully clear soon after my return that the representatives of the Chinese Government had no intention to adhere to their promises. 1/

1959

In February 1959^{2/} Tan Kuan-san, the Chinese commander at Lhasa, issued an 'invitation' to the Dalai Lama to come to the Military Area Headquarters alone - and not, as was usual, with his entourage - to attend a luncheon party,

1/ The Sunday Statesman (India) 21 June 1959; The New York Times, 21 June 1959; (The Question of Tibet, doc. 19, p. 197).

2/ See the Dalai Lama's statement at Tezpur, 18 April 1959: 'the Dalai Lama agreed a month in advance to attend a cultural show in the Chinese headquarters. (The Question of Tibet, doc. 17).

which was to be followed by an acrobatic display.^{1/} The invitation was delivered to the Dalai Lama personally, and not, as was customary, through the Kashag and the Household. The date on which he was to appear was fixed at 10 March. News of the invitation got abroad. On 9 March 1959^{2/} a group of Tibetans met the Indian Consul-General at Lhasa and spoke to him about their fears and apprehensions.

On 10 March a crowd of about 10,000 Tibetans surrounded the Norbulingka Palace - the summer palace where the Dalai Lama was staying at the time - and demanded that he should refrain from going to the Chinese military headquarters.

On hearing of this demonstration, Tan Kuan-san wrote to the Dalai Lama (on 10 March), 'Since you have been put into very great difficulties, due to intrigues and provocations by reactionaries, it may be advisable that you do not come for the time being.' On 11 March, the Dalai Lama wrote to Tan, admitting that 'reactionary evil elements are carrying out activities endangering me, under the pretext of protecting my safety. If you have any internal directives for me, please tell me frankly through this messenger.' The letter was sent through Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the principal pro-Chinese Tibetan, next to the Panchen Lama.

Tan Kuan-san replied on 11 March, pointing out indignantly that the 'reactionaries' had erected fortifications and had posted large numbers of machine-guns and 'armed reactionaries' along the national defence highway, north of Norbulingka. He (Tan Kuan-san) had ordered them, through certain officials, to remove these fortifications and to withdraw themselves. The responsibility for the consequences of disobeying these orders would be borne by the 'reactionaries'.

Replying to this on 12 March, the Dalai Lama informed Tan Kuan-san that he (the Dalai Lama) had ordered the Kashag, on 11 March, to dissolve 'the illegal people's conference' and to ask the 'reactionaries' to withdraw.^{3/}

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- ^{1/} One remembers the invitation issued to Gyurmed Ramgyal on 11 November 1750. See above, p. 9.
 - ^{2/} See Mr Nehru's statement in the Indian Parliament on 23 March 1959. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Fortnightly News Digest, 16-31 March 1959, p. 181. Mr Nehru spoke of this approach to the Indian Consul-General as having been made 'about two weeks ago', and three days before the women's demonstration. This places it on 9 March.
 - ^{3/} The full text of the correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Tan Kuan-san is published in the Hsinhua News Agency (HNA) Daily Bulletin, 31 March 1959. Its authenticity was admitted by the Dalai Lama to Mr Nehru at Mussoorie on 24 April 1959.

On that same day - 12 March 1959 - some 5,000 Tibetan women called on the consular representatives of India, Nepal, and Bhutan, requesting these officials to accompany them to the Chinese military headquarters to witness the presentation of certain demands. The consuls, correctly, refused to interfere in internal matters, and the demands were never presented. But this undelivered manifesto, when signed by the representatives of the principal monasteries, the National Assembly, and the Kashag, became, in effect, a national Declaration of independence. The Declaration denounced the Sino-Tibetan agreement, proclaimed Tibet an independent state, and called for the withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Tibet.

Meanwhile, on 14 March, the Dalai Lama made a speech to more than 70 Tibetan officials, 'instructing them from various angles, and calling on them to consider seriously present and long-term interests, and to calm down, or my life would be in danger'.^{1/}

'A few days from now,' wrote the Dalai Lama to Tan Kuan-san 'when there are enough forces that I can trust, I shall make my way to the Military Command Area secretly'.^{1/}

'While these negotiations were being carried on', said the Dalai Lama at Tezpur on 18 April 1959,

reinforcements arrived to strengthen the Chinese garrison in Lhasa and Tibet. On 17 March^{2/} two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of Norbulingka palace. Fortunately, the shells fell in a pond nearby. After this the [Dalai Lama's] advisers became alive to the danger to the person of the Dalai Lama; and, in those difficult circumstances, it became imperative for the Dalai Lama, the members of his family and his high officials, to leave Lhasa.

On the night of 17 March, therefore, the Dalai Lama escaped from Norbulingka, dressed as an ordinary lama, and fled south-eastwards toward India.

On 19 March, according to the Chinese Government's statement of 28 March,^{3/} 'most members of the Tibetan local government, and the upper strata of the

^{1/} Dalai Lama to Tan Kuan-san, 16 March 1959.

^{2/} The 'informed sources' who stated at Delhi on 20 March that fighting had been in progress in and around Lhasa 'for the past three days' (The Times, 21 March 1959) were, apparently, right. Mr Nehru's statement, on 23 March, that fighting had broken out 'last Friday' (20 March) is slightly inaccurate.

^{3/} Order of the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic, HNA, 29 March 1959.

reactionary clique' ordered the Tibetan army and 'rebellious elements' to attack the Chinese forces in Lhasa. The rebellion, according to the news communique published on the same day was crushed on 22 March.^{1/} But, according to information conveyed to the heir-apparent of Sikkim by 'official sources' just before he left Gangtok for Tokyo,^{2/} the Norbulingka palace was not captured till the 24th, after two days of fighting and shelling. The fighting was particularly heavy on the 24th. In the course of this the Chakpori lamasery, which had been used as a nationalist arsenal, was blown up. Sera and Drepung were subdued by shelling after the capture of Norbulingka.

On 29 March two emissaries of the Dalai Lama reached the Indian border check-post at Kanzeymane, near Chuttangmu, in the Towang sub-division of Kameng Frontier Division, in the North-East Frontier Agency and requested asylum for the Dalai Lama, who was expected to arrive the next day. On the evening of 31 March, while a thick unseasonable blanket of cloud hung over the eastern Himalayas, thus effectively preventing detection by aircraft, the Dalai Lama, with a party of 80 persons, crossed the frontier into India.^{3/}

We have now reached the end of our story, and two general conclusions seem permissible.

Firstly, that in so far as the political relationship between China and Tibet is concerned, the People's Republic of China has done no more than to assert the common Chinese Republican claim - common to both Nationalists and Communists - that China exercises rights of sovereignty, not suzerainty, in Tibet. Hence, Tibet is regarded as 'integral part of China', though Tibetan claims to autonomy would, at least, be considered.

The Nationalist claim to 'sovereignty' in Tibet was based, again, on a certain view of the Chinese Imperial relationship with Tibet. In 1907 Britain and Russia used the word 'suzerainty' to describe this relationship, and took it to mean, apparently, the exclusive right of China to handle Tibet's foreign relations. But, as we have seen, since the early eighteenth century, China has enjoyed the right not only to handle Tibet's foreign relations, but also her defence; and has, furthermore, had the privilege of posting a political and military representative (or representatives), and a garrison in Tibet. The argument has been, by and large, about the powers of these representatives, and the numbers of the garrison. At its fullest (in 1793) - but only perhaps then -

1/ HNA, 29 March 1959.

2/ See his statement at Tokyo on 27 March 1959 (The Times, 28 March 1959).

3/ Mr Nehru's statement in the Indian Parliament, 3 April 1959. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Fortnightly News Digest, 1-15 April 1959, p. 205.

Chinese Imperial authority in Tibet was, no doubt, indistinguishable from sovereignty.

The Chinese Empire itself, however, never claimed rights of sovereignty in Tibet. The reorganization of 1750-1 was put forward as a restoration of conditions which existed at the time of the fifth Dalai Lama; and it was expressly stated that the ruler of Tibet was the Dalai Lama.^{1/} Even in 1793 the Emperor acted merely as a 'Protector of the Yellow Sect'. Tibet, therefore, was claimed as no more than a Protectorate of the Empire of China.^{2/}

But whatever the nature of the past political relationship between China and Tibet, the present-day view of the matter has been neatly put in a statement issued by the Executive Committee of the Nepal Congress Party on 3 May 1959:

The historical perspective was not sufficient for anyone today to claim sovereignty over Tibet. To claim Chinese sovereignty on the basis of some historical facts was in the tradition of the imperialists of the past. China should take into consideration Asian resurgence.^{3/}

Secondly, unlike the Celestial Empire, and in spite of Article 11 of the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951, the People's Republic of China has imposed on Tibet not only a political relationship but also a doctrine of radical social and economic reform. The Dalai Lama has said at Mussoorie on 20 June 1959 that his Government has never been opposed to necessary reforms in the social and economic and political systems in Tibet.^{4/} But the fact remains that these reforms are being introduced by the Chinese. And it has to be admitted that to reduce the vast landholdings of the monasteries, to redistribute land among the tillers of the soil, to utilise the immobilized labour force in monk's garb, to introduce modern education - these, and others, are not undesirable reforms. But the very fact that they have been introduced by the Chinese raises the old question whether reforms imposed by a foreigner are any substitute for self-government.

^{1/} Petech, p. 213.

^{2/} See above, p. 12.

^{3/} The Times, 4 May 1959.

^{4/} The Question of Tibet doc. 19, p. 198. In this statement the Dalai Lama in fact claims to have put forward certain reforms which were rejected by the Chinese.

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The other sources of information have been indicated in the footnotes.

